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III. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. Introduction 
Plaintiff-Appellant Tina Venable (hereinafter "Venable") lodged her Appellant's 
Opening Briefon October 29,2013. In it, Venable contended she remains entitled to a 
jury trial on her claim for wrongful discharge of employment in violation of public 
policy. In support of her contention, Venable argued (1) Idaho recognizes a narrow 
exception to "at-will" employment when the employer's motivation for the termination 
contravenes public policy; (2) the Idaho Consumer Protection Act constitutes a sufficient 
source of public policy for creating an exception to the "at-will" employment doctrine; 
(3) Venable produced sufficient evidence demonstrating she engaged in the protected 
activity of reporting and refusing to commit unlawful acts and practices which violated 
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; and (4) a causal connection existed between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action taken against Venable. 
In turn, Defendant-Respondent Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Internet Auto") submitted its Respondent's Briefon November 26,2013. In it, Internet 
Auto asserted primarily that Venable presented insufficient evidence to overcome 
summary judgment. More specifically, it stated that the record: "[D]oes not contain even 
a scintilla of admissible evidence that the acts about which she allegedly complained 
were actually unlawful or that her employment was terminated because she either 
complained about those acts or that she refused to participate in them." Respondent's 
Brief, p. 15 (emphasis added). Internet Auto, however, continued to agree with Venable 
that Idaho recognizes a narrow exception to "at-will" employment when the motivation 
for the termination contravenes public policy. Id. at 13. It seemed to further accept the 
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proposition that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act represents a sufficient source of 
public policy for creating an exception to the "at-will" employment doctrine. See 
generally Respondent's Brief Clearly, it does. Thus, Venable shall not offer any reply to 
whether Idaho recognizes a narrow public policy exception to "at-will" employment and 
whether Venable adequately identified the Consumer Protection Act as a sufficient 
source of public policy for invoking this narrow exception to "at-will" employment. Nor 
does Venable plan to reply to Internet Auto's frequent reference to the facts presented 
during the trial on Venable's claim for Slander Per Se since Venable elected to forego 
any such issues on appeal and to focus exclusively on the wrongful discharge claim and 
the facts of record relating to it. 
Rather, the remainder of this Appellant's Reply Brief shall demonstrate that the 
sworn testimony of Venable, Robert Heath, Joey Winter, and Chris Plaza give clear rise 
to genuine issues of material fact on whether Venable was terminated for engaging in 
protected activity. 
B. At a Minimum, Venable has Shown that she Refused to Commit the 
Unlawful and Deceptive Act of Passing on Acguistion Fees to 
Consumers. 
Venable has shown that she refused to commit the unlawful and deceptive act and 
practice of passing on acquisition fees to consumers. Venable spent most of her adult life 
working in the automotive sales industry where she has received training in every aspect 
of the business model, including "sales and sales management, finance and finance 
management, warranty coverage, gap insurance, lender acquisition fees, and business 
ethics." R., Vol. I, p. 337. With this professional experience in her background, Venable 
reported to her General Sales Manager, Mr. Chris Plaza, and other members of the 
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management team that the assignment of acquisition fees to consumers, in her good faith 
opinion, violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. R., Vol. I, pp. 338-339. Moreover, 
witness Joey Winter testified from personal knowledge how he recalled that Venable had 
made reports to General Sales Manager Chris Plaza about the existence of improper 
conduct occurring at the dealership. See Winter Depo. Tr., p. 65, L. 13 - p. 66, L. 3 at R., 
Vol. I, p. 368. Witness Robert Heath averred that General Sales Manager Chris Plaza 
instructed the members of the Internet Department to "pass on acquisition fees to 
customers which were charged by lending institutions in subprime transactions and were 
to be paid directly by the dealership to the lender." R., Vol. I, pp. 354-357. Even 
General Sales Manager Chris Plaza testified that it would "Absolutely" be considered a 
deceptive business practice to pass acquisition fees onto customers without the 
customer's knowledge. Tr., p. 347, Ll. 7-19. 
The above facts taken from the record are not merely conclusory and most 
definitely constitute more than a "scintilla" of proof. It is an accepted fact that Venable 
advised her General Sales Manager that passing on acquisition fees violated consumer 
protection laws. Venable herself testified to the fact, and it was obviously corroborated 
by witness Joey Winter. Additionally, Robert Heath swore under oath that General Sales 
Manager Chris Plaza instructed the Internet Department to pass on acquisition fees to 
consumers. These are hard, genuine, and material facts clearly set forth in the record. 
Frankly, these facts should have been cited by the district court as a basis for denying 
Internet Auto's motion for summary judgment. 
In its brief, Internet Auto attempts to make hay out of the fact that witness Robert 
Heath admitted that whether Internet Auto practiced such illegal acts was pure 
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speculation. Respondent's Brief, p. 16, f, n. 3. In so doing, Internet Auto clearly 
overlooks the most crucial point. It is not whether employees at Internet Auto in fact 
broke the law. It is whether Internet Auto through its General Sales Manager Chris Plaza 
instructed the employees to break the law by engaging in deceptive acts and practices in 
violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. The fact Mr. Heath would be 
speculating over whether the law was violated is a further testament to the fact that both 
he and Venable refused to violate the law by refusing to follow the instructions given to 
them by their General Sales Manager. The law in Idaho plainly and correctly protects 
those employees who refuse to commit unlawful acts. Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. 
Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 640-641, 272 P.3d 1263, 1271-1272 (2012); Sorensen v. 
Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668 (1990). The facts clearly show Venable refused to 
convey acquisition fees onto customers of Internet Auto. 
When applying the standard on summary judgment to the facts of record, Venable 
has shown she refused to engage in the deceptive practice of passing acquisition fees on 
to consumers. The fact Venable reported and refused to commit the unlawful act of 
transferring acquisition fees to consumers could not be clearer from the record on appeal. 
Venable's refusal to commit this unlawful act presents a well recognized exception to at-
will employment, as does her fulfillment of perfonning the important public function of 
reporting such violations to management at Internet Auto. Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 
118 Idaho 664, 668, 799 P.2d 70, 74 (1990). As noted above, at a minimum, Venable has 
shown that she refused to commit the unlawful and deceptive act and practice of passing 
on acquisition fees to consumers. 
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But the issue on acquisition fees only presents one example of the many deceptive 
acts that Venable observed while employed at Internet Auto. In her Opening Brief, 
Venable itemized the following several other acts and practices she believed fell in 
violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act: 
a. Internet Auto illegally charged for auto warranties 
in transactions where the consumer was purchasing 
the vehicle in the "As Is" condition; 
b. Internet Auto illegally charged for gap insurance in 
transactions where the consumer opted out of gap 
coverage; 
c. Internet Auto falsely advertised vehicles "for sale" 
which did not even exist in the inventory and falsely 
misrepresented the history of pre-owned vehicles to 
consumers; 
d. Internet Auto sold vehicles to consumers in excess 
of their advertised prices; 
e. Internet Auto engaged in the deceptive practice of 
failing to disclose all material contractual and 
financial tern1S to consumers, engaging in what is 
known in the industry as "packed payments"; 
f. Internet Auto deceived consumers into believing the 
dealership had agreed to lower the sales price of 
units when in fact it had only extended the term of 
the loan, and thereby reduced the monthly payment 
amount disclosed to the consumer; 
g. Internet Auto further deceived consumers by 
employing a variety of "bait and switch" tactics 
designed to trick consumers into believing they 
were to receive one vehicle only to then substitute it 
later for another vehicle of lesser quality and value; 
See Opening Brief, pp. 15-16 and R., Vol. I, pp. 337-338 (emphasis added). 
It is not fair to say Venable's claim is grounded on nothing more than 
conclusions. It is not as if Venable came to the district court and said that Internet Auto 
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instructed me to violate the law and you will simply have to trust me. Rather, based on 
her observations, Venable cited the district court to a laundry list of isolated and discreet 
practices she believed were deceptive and therefore in violation of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act. Venable also produced corroborating evidence via the swom testimony 
of Robert Heath and Joey Winter. When viewed as a whole, Venable has definitely 
tumed over more than a "scintilla" of admissible evidence on whether she reported the 
existence of deceptive acts occurring at the dealership and whether she refused to engage 
in the deceptive acts so reported. 
The district court committed clear error by granting summary judgment in favor 
of Intemet Auto. 
c. Venable has Demonstrated a Nexus between her Protected Activity 
and the Adverse Action taken Against her by her Employer - Internet 
Auto. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously recognized the question of causation is 
generally one for the jury. See Bollinger v. Fall River Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 
640-641, 272 P.3d 1263, 1271-1272 (2012). As shown below, a satisfactory level of 
proof exists here for following the general rule of sending the issue of causation to the 
jury. After making the above referenced reports to Intemet Auto, Venable was first told 
that she should mind her own business and was later told that this is how "we do 
business" and to get on board or words to that affect. R., Vol. I, p. 338-339. Shortly 
thereafter, Venable was terminated. The temporal relationship between Venable's 
reporting of the unlawful acts and her refusal to get on board with such tactics, coupled 
with her involuntary termination alone gives rise to a jury question. In fact, this Court so 
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found in the case of Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 398, 224 
P.3d 458, 465 (2008): 
We find that Curlee presented a prima facie case of 
retaliatory discharge. The close relation in time between 
the discovery of her documentation of her coworkers' 
waste and her termination supports the reasonable inference 
that Curlee was discharged for that documentation. 
"Although there must be something more than pure 
speculation or conjecture, circumstantial evidence may 
provide an inference of causation. Proximity in time 
between the protected activity and the adverse employment 
action is 'particularly significant. ,,, Heng. 688 N. W.2d at 
399 (internal citation omitted). We recognize that a jury 
may well decide that KCFR did not discharge Curlee in 
retaliation for her documentation of waste. However, that 
determination properly belongs to the jury at trial and not 
the judge at the summary judgment stage. For that reason, 
we vacate the district court's order granting summary 
judgment in favor of KCFR. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
FUlihermore, under the fact pattern here, based upon the summary judgment 
standard, district courts are truly not disposed with the power to accept as true the 
employer's position that the employee was fired for some, other legitimate reason. Van 
v. Portneuf Med. Center, 147 Idaho 552, 560, 212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009). This legal 
principle should hold true here since Internet Auto's stated reason for the termination 
defies logic. Its own termination form reflects the discharge was due to "services no 
longer needed." R., Vol. I, p. 261. Nevertheless, Venable had only recently been hired to 
fill the position of Internet Manager on March 15, 2011, and was then fired just a short 
time later on April 21, 2011. It is nonsensical to believe that Venable's services could no 
longer be needed in such a short time after her date of hire. It is not as though Internet 
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Auto offered evidence suggesting it decided to ahandon its Tnternet Department. Under 
the facts ofthis case, Internet Auto's stated reason for the termination reeks of pretext. 
Perhaps this explains why the stated reason changed during the unemployment 
proceedings. There, Internet Auto's basis for the termination shifted from services no 
longer needed to not meeting sales goals. R., Vol. I, p. 261. In other words, Internet 
Auto's stated basis for the termination switched from non-performance based to 
performance-based reasons. ld. 
Suffice it to say that Venable has demonstrated a causal connection between her 
protected activity and the adverse action taken against her in the form of her wrongful 
termination. The direct and circumstantial evidence coupled with the temporal proximity 
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action satisfies the standard 
applicable on motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, the district court committed 
reversible error by taking Venable's claim away from ajury. 
CONCLUSION 
Venable respectfully asks this Court to vacate the district court's order granting 
summary judgment to Internet Auto on Venable's claim for wrongful discharge of 
employment in violation of public policy. 
DATED this 1±day of December, 2013. 
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laintiff-Appellant 
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